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NOTE

Where Does Forum For Academic and
Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld Leave
Military Recruiting Efforts?
ANGEL M. OVERGAARDt
INTRODUCTION

The Solomon Amendment requires law schools to treat
the military as any other employer, 1 even though any other
employer with the same discriminatory hiring practices
would not be allowed to recruit on campus. 2 Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld asks the
Court to decide which is more important: a law school's
right to uninhibited expression or the government's ability
to condition spending, namely on the military's ability to
recruit equally on campuses. The case not only evokes
complicated constitutional questions but raises many

t J.D. Candidate 2006, University at Buffalo Law School. The author would like
to thank Professor James A. Gardner for his thoughtful feedback on an earlier
draft, Michael Mann for helping the author decide to write on this topic, and
David Rettenmaier for his comments and patience throughout this entire
process.
1. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2004), amended by Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat.
1811, 1911 (2004).
2. See Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. § 6-3(b) (Jan.
5, 2004), available at http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html.

1313

1314

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 3

questions. 3 Stifling
social
and
ethical
difficult
are both significant
security
discrimination and national
corollaries. On one hand, universities, and law schools in
particular, need to maintain consistency with their internal
policies, pursue a just and equal ideal, and foster a learning
environment that is comfortable for a diverse student
population. On the other, the United States needs to recruit
the finest possible military personnel and wants to
maintain an all-volunteer military. Military recruiting is
especially relevant during this time of war, when the
demand for officers is high. However, if Congress would
repeal the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the military would
have several thousand more recruits. 4 Fleeting discussions
of a draft and the looming possibility of additional armed
conflicts should have all ears tuned into this possible
variation in recruiting efforts.5
Given the current (and impending) Court membership
and the present political climate, the appellees will likely be
successful representing the military in its appeal. Further,
the Court has already upheld the constitutionality of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" when challenged on equal protection
argument than
grounds, a seemingly much more obvious
6
one for a First Amendment violation.

3. Other interesting questions include: Should JAG, as an employer, be
punished for the federal government's policy against homosexuality? Are the
law schools themselves discriminating against those who do not approve of
homosexuality? How much impact does face-to-face military recruiting actually
have on law students? Are other recruiting efforts as effective?
4. Since 1994, more than 8700 service members have been discharged under
this policy. David Keating, Rumsfeld, Donald (Defense Secy.), et al. v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, et al., MEDILL SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM-ON THE
DOCKET (lay 3, 2005), http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/002406
print.php. It seems that if the military is truly concerned about recruiting they
should keep the soldiers that they already have.
5. See William A. Kamens, Selective Disservice: The Indefensible
Discriminationof Draft Registration, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 734 & n. 237, 75152 & n. 377 (2003) (noting shortfalls in military recruiting).
6. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 948 (1996) (rejecting heightened scrutiny for the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy); see also Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
Richenberg v. Cohen, 522 U.S. 807 (1997) (rejecting that homosexuals are a
"suspect classification" requiring strict scrutiny); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l
Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1998)
(stating that "homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class"
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However, the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is
hypocritical and without basis. Congress is passing
regulations and funding measures that counteract what
they have spent decades trying to eradicate-hate based on
a person's identity, whether it be based on his or her race,
religion, sex, or sexual orientation. In addition, not allowing
the military equal access to career service resources
appears to have little to no impact on the quality of recruits.
Military life clearly is quite different than that of the rest of
society. However, the Solomon Amendment (in light of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell) extends far beyond our
constitutional requirements of equality, and it does so
without any logical, much less statistical, basis. Thus, this
note argues that the Solomon Amendment should be found
unconstitutional.
This Note explores whether the Solomon Amendment is
a valid exercise of the spending power or an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to indirectly regulate expression
through its spending power. It asks whether the Solomon
Amendment places an unconstitutional condition on federal
funds by conditioning a coercive amount of money on the
relinquishment of First Amendment rights. Next, the Note
considers whether the importance of First Amendment
rights outweighs the alleged needs of the military.7 This
note then examines the possible First Amendment
violations implicating the unconstitutionality of the
Solomon Amendment. It questions whether the right of a
law school as an expressive association with academic
freedom outweighs an unsupported Amendment that
coerces a law school into representing a point of view with
which it disagrees.
Part I of this Note gives a brief history of the conflict
between the Solomon Amendment and law schools. Part II
briefly discusses the decisions of the District Court of New
Jersey8 and the Third Circuit in Forum for Academic and
and military "don't ask don't tell" policy is only subject to "rational basis
review").
7. Our founding fathers would likely agree that the unsubstantiated needs
of the military are not more important than individual liberties given that the
underlying reason for the Third Amendment was to keep the military out of our
homes. See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
8. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
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Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld 9 and examines the issues
on appeal to the Supreme Court. Part III first focuses on
the spending power and unconstitutional conditions, then
on the main First Amendment arguments implicating the
unconstitutional conditions. The initial First Amendment
issue examined is the right of expressive association. The
discussion particularly focuses on the cases of Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston and the strong, yet ironic
effect these seemingly anti-gay rights cases have in
bolstering the argument of Forum for Academic and
Institutional Right (FAIR), which could register a victory
for gay rights.'( The discussion then turns to expressive
conduct, and the FAIR case is examined under the standard
set forth in United States v. O'Brien. Next, the note touches
on what academic freedom adds to the other arguments.
Finally, a possible argument for compelled speech is
explored. The note concludes with a brief comment
concerning the particular relevance a decision declaring the
Solomon Amendment unconstitutional could have for a
public university.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOLOMON AND
LAW SCHOOLS

The United States military excludes from service those
who have "engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act."'" The well-known
compromise of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" codified the military's
long-standing policy regarding homosexuals in 1993.12 As
early as the 1980s, law schools refused to allow the military

1977 (2005). For clarity, the district's court's decision will be referred to as
"FAIR I."
9. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005). For clarity, the Third
Circuit's decision will be referred to as "FAIR II."
10. See Shannon P. Duffy, 3d Circuit Voids Law School FundingRestriction
Amendment Required Access for Military Recruiters Despite Anti-Gay Policies,
231 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 1 (Nov. 30, 2004) (calling the FAIR decision a

major victory for gay rights advocates).
11. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2004).
12. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2004) for the complete
homosexuality in the armed forces.

policy concerning
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to recruit on campuses because of the conflict between the
military's policy against homosexuals and schools'
nondiscrimination policies. 13 In 1990, the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS) 14 unanimously voted to
include in its nondiscrimination policy a prohibition against
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 15 According to
Executive Committee Regulations of the Association of
American Law Schools § 6-3.2,
a. A member school shall inform employers of its obligation under
Bylaw 6-3(b), and shall require employers, as a condition of
obtaining any form of placement assistance or use of the school's
facilities, to provide an assurance of the employer's willingness to
observe the principles of equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-3(b).
b. A member school has an obligation to investigate any
complaints concerning discriminatory practices against its
students to assure that placement assistance and facilities are
made available only to employers whose practices are consistent
16
with the principles of equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-3(b).

Thereafter, virtually all law schools 17 adopted
8
prohibition in their own nondiscrimination policies.'

the

13. See Christopher J. Kalil, SUNY Buffalo & Military Recruiters:Funding
Unconstitutional Conditions?, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 891, 894-95 & n. 15 (1991)

(recounting battles between law schools and military recruiters).
14. The AALS is a nonprofit professional accreditation organization whose
purpose is "the improvement of the legal profession through legal education."
What is the AALS?, http://wwwaals.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
The association is "legal education's principal representative to the federal
government." Id.
15. See Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. § 6-3(b)
(Jan. 5, 2004), availableat http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html.
16. Executive Committee Regulations of the Association of American Law
Schools § 6-3.2 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.aals.org/ecr/. There are 166
member law schools. What is the AALS?, supra note 14.
17. William Mitchell College of Law, because it is not part of a university
system, is one of the few law schools able to forgo the minimum federal funds it
receives and bar the military altogether. Michelle Lore, Law Schools Closely
Monitor Suit Over the Solomon Amendment, MINN. LAW., Nov. 3, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 16071857. This brings up another distinction in the
debate. Perhaps law schools could exist without the federal money, but their
parent institutions likely could not be as effective. The vast majority of federal
money goes to student aid and research programs, which are coincidentally
helpful to both the government and the students.
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Given the necessity of enlisting qualified men and
women in the military and Congress' requirement that the
armed forces "conduct intensive recruiting campaigns" to
encourage military enlistments, 19 the military has placed
recruiting on college campuses high up on its priority list.20
To maintain its virtually unrestricted power derived from
Article I of the Constitution to "raise and support" military
forces for the defense of the United States, 21 in 1995,
Congress
passed the Solomon Amendment. 22 The
Amendment attached to the annual defense appropriation
bill and withheld all Department of Defense (DoD) funding
from any educational institution with a policy of denying or
effectively preventing the military from obtaining entry to
campuses for recruiting purposes. 23 For some universities,

18. An example of a school's nondiscrimination policy from the State
University of New York at Buffalo's Student Rules and Regulations (Article 5B)
follows:
The University at Buffalo is committed to fostering a positive
environment for learning, and to ensuring the safety, rights, and
dignity of every member of the University community. It is the policy of
the University at Buffalo to prohibit invidious categorical
discrimination based on such characteristics as race, gender, sexual
orientation, age, national origin, religion, or disability in all matters
affecting employment or educational opportunities within the
University itself. It is the firm belief of the Council, the faculty, and the
administration that judgments about persons within the University
should be based on their individual merits, accomplishments,
aptitudes, and behavior, and that invidious categorical discrimination
is wholly inappropriate to the University's mission and values.
STATEMENT ON PREJUDICE BIGOTRY AND INTOLERANCE (2005), http:lwww.
student-affairs.buffalo.edu/diversity/prejudice.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
19. 10 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (codifying Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment
Act of 1945, ch. 393, § 2, 59 Stat. 538 (1945)).
20. Cf. United States v. Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
22. Named for Representative Gerald Solomon of New York who sponsored
the amendment to the annual defense appropriation bill. The Solomon
Amendment is currently codified in 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2004), amended by Ronald
W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004).
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-337 § 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994) ("No funds available to the
Department of Defense may be provided by grant or contract to any institution
of higher education that has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents,
the Secretary of Defense from obtaining for military recruiting purposes--(A)
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potential loss was24 enormous, amounting to hundreds of
millions of dollars.
In 1996, Congress put law schools at risk of losing
federal financial aid needed by students when it extended
Solomon to include funds from the Departments of
Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services. 25 AALS
responded by amending its nondiscrimination policy to
excuse noncompliance with Bylaw 6-4,26 to allow military
recruiters on campus as long as law schools took measures
to reduce the possible negative impact of the military's
presence on schools' nondiscrimination policies. 27 In 1999,
entry to campuses or access to students on campuses; or (B) access to directory
information pertaining to students.") (codified in 10 U.S.C. § 983, amended by
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act § 552).
24. See With Big Bucks at Stake, HarvardLaw OK's Military Recruiters, 11
N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER 1731 (2002) (if Harvard excluded military
recruiters they would lose $328 million in federal financing, about sixteen
percent of its operating budget); Yale Law Lets Military Back On-Campus:
School Bends, at Least Temporarily, in Face of Cutbacks, 28 CONN. L. TRIB. 10
(Oct. 7, 2002) (if Yale barred the military, the entire university would lose about
$300 million).
25. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 514(b), 110 Stat. 3009-270 (1996) (codified in 10 U.S.C. § 983, amended by
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act § 552).
26. Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. § 6-4(b) (2001),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Solomon/bylaw.html. This is the
old version of the nondiscrimination section. See supra note 2 for the location of
the current policy.
27. Some examples of ameliorative measures include hosting student
forums at which students and others can discuss discrimination by the military,
actively supporting gay and lesbian student organizations, and establishing a
"Safe Zone" program that teaches faculty, staff, and students about sexual
orientation and trains them to respond sensitively to the concerns of gays and
lesbians. Military Recruiting at Law School Career Services Offices: Update on
Actions Regarding Executive Committee Regulation 6.19, the Obligation to
Provide Equal Opportunity to Obtain Employment Without Discrimination,
Memorandum 97-46 from Carl C. Monk, Executive Vice President and
Executive Director of the AALS, to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools
(Aug. 13, 1997) (on file with the Association of American Law Schools),
available at http://www.aals.org/97-46.html; see also CHAI RACHEL FELDBLUM &
MICHAEL BouCAI, DUE JUSTICE: AMELIORATION FOR LAW SCHOOL COMPLIANCE
A HANDBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOLS,
WITH THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT:

(last visited
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/handbook.pdf
Oct. 11, 2005); Memorandum 98-23 from Bari Burke, AALS Deputy Director, to
Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools (May 14, 1996) (on file with the
Association of American Law Schools), available at http://www.aals.org/9823.html (listing examples of ameliorative activities).
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Congress removed student financial aid from the funds cut
for noncompliance with Solomon. 28 AALS thus returned to
requiring compliance with Bylaw 6-4.29
In 2000, the DoD amended its regulations to cut funds
to entire university systems if their law school refused to
allow recruiters from Judge Advocate General's (JAG)
Departments 30 on campus. 31 After the September 11
terrorist
attacks,
Congress
determined
that
the
32
ameliorative measures in place were no longer acceptable.
Likely, because of the immediate need for troops, as well as
the country's aversion to anything appearing unsupportive
of our defense effort, the DoD started an informal policy
requiring that schools treat military recruiters equal to
other employers or risk losing all federal funds. 33 Several
law schools submitted declarations to the court detailing
DoD threats of withdrawing all their federal funding "if the
school did not afford the military full access to career
services, the students, and the law schools. ' 34 In 2004,
Congress amended the Solomon Amendment to codify the
DoD's informal policy. 35 In so doing, the House Committee
Report noted:
[A]t no time since World War II, has our Nation's freedom and
security relied more upon our military than now as we engage in

28. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000, § 8120, Pub. L. No.
106-79, 113 Stat. 1212, 1260 (1999) (codified in 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2), amended
by Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act § 552).
29. Memorandum 00-2 from Carl Monk, Executive Vice President and
Executive Director of the AALS, to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools
(Jan. 24, 2000), (on file with the Association of American Law Schools),
available at http://www.aals.org/00-2.html.
30. Each branch of the military has its own JAG Department or Corps. JAG
officers provide legal services for their respective military branches.
31. 65 Fed. Reg. 2056 (Jan. 13, 2000) (codified in 10 U.S.C. § 983(b),
amended by Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act § 552).
32. One's symbolic support of the nation became at least as important as
one's actual support.
33. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 227 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct.
1977 (2005).
34. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 282 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing Am. Compl. 36;
Chemerinsky Decl. 21; Gerken Decl. 16), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 1977 (2005).
35. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b), amended by Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act § 552.
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the global war on terrorism. Our Nation's all volunteer armed
services have been called upon to serve and they are performing
their mission at the highest standard. The military's ability to
perform at this standard can only be maintained with effective and
uninhibited recruitment programs.
Successful recruitment relies heavily upon the ability of military
recruiters to have access to students on the campuses
of colleges
36
and universities that is equal to other employers.

Accordingly, law schools and their parent institutions
now have the option of either violating their own
nondiscrimination policies and allowing military recruiting
in a manner that is "at least equal in quality and scope to
the access of campuses and to students that is provided to
any other employer 37 or losing, in some cases, hundreds of
millions of dollars in federal funding made available
through the Department of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other
enumerated agencies. 38
Presently, if a law school allows on-campus recruiting,
the military must be allowed on campus as well. For
example, if the career services office (CSO) 39 sends an email
to students regarding fall recruiting, if the military
requests to be included, it must be listed as a recruiter with
the rest of the employers. If students are interested in
interviewing with the military, CSOs will be in charge of
scheduling and finding a room for the interview (if they do

36. H.R. REP. No. 108-443, pt. 1, at 3-4 (2004).
37. Id. at 3.
38. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (d)(1) (2005).
39. Law school offices that deal with recruiting will be referred to as CSOs
throughout this note. CSOs act as liaisons between the student body and
certain recruiters. In their liaison role, CSOs post jobs available for students
through eattorney.com, email, signs, and other media. They then often take
resumes, writing samples, transcripts, and other required materials and
forward them to the employer involved. Sometimes they simply make available
information for students, such as available jobs and resources to find available
jobs for the student to pursue on their own. JAG recruiters, for example, come
on campus at the University at Buffalo Law School in the fall and in the spring,
and the CSO forwards student resumes to JAG and sets up interview times and
locations. The student, however, obtains the required JAG application and
sends it directly to JAG.
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that actually meet their

II. FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS V.
RUMSFELD

A. The District Court
In September 2003, FAIR 40 sued the DoD 41 in the
United States District Court of New Jersey seeking to
preliminarily
enjoin
enforcement
of the
Solomon
Amendment. 42 FAIR challenged the constitutionality of the
Solomon Amendment under five causes of action. First, they
argued that the DoD was misconstruing the language of the
Solomon Amendment by forcing law schools to treat equally
military recruiters and employers who satisfy the law
school's nondiscrimination policy, rather than, for example,
allowing JAG recruiters ameliorated access. Also, FAIR
contended the DoD was misapplying the Solomon
Amendment by withholding funds from the entire
university instead of just the law school. 43 Second, FAIR
alleged the Solomon Amendment was an unconstitutional
condition which impinged on the First Amendment rights of
academic freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom to
associate with one another in pursuit of common
objectives. 44 Third, FAIR claimed viewpoint discrimination
in violation of the First Amendment because funding is only
withdrawn from schools that exclude military recruiters in
protest, not from schools that exclude military recruiters for
40. The plaintiffs, collectively known as "FAIR" consist of the Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR); Society of American Law Teachers,
Inc. (SALT); The Coalition for Equality (CFE); Rutgers Gay and Lesbian
Caucus (RGLC); law students Pam Nickisher, Leslie Fischer, and Michael
Blauschild; and law professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Sylvia Law.
41. The defendants, collectively known as "the DoD" are Donald Rumsfeld,
in his capacity as U.S. Secretary of Defense; Rod Paige, as U.S. Secretary of
Education; Elaine Chao, as U.S. Secretary of Labor; Tommy Thompson, as U.S.
Secretary of Health and Human Services; Norman Y. Mineta, as U.S. Secretary
of Transportation; Tom Ridge, as U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security.
42. Complaint, FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (No. 03 Civ. 4433).
43. Second Amended Complaint at 22, FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (No. 03
Civ. 4433).
44. Id.
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other reasons. 45 Fourth, FAIR charged compelled
Solomon
the
because
dissent
speech/suppressed
Amendment does not allow FAIR to express dissent to the
military's discriminatory 46hiring practices without losing
necessary federal funding.
FAIR further alleged the Solomon Amendment was void
for vagueness under the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it restricts
speech and association and "lacks sufficient definitions or
guidance regarding its application, grants unfettered
discretion to DOD and low-level military officers to decide
what constitutes compliance." 47 FAIR further alleged a
Fifth Amendment due process violation because a finding
that a school was violating the Amendment allowed for
withdrawal of funds without a hearing. 48 Finally, FAIR
charged "[t]he DoD's elimination of the subelement
limitation from the regulations governing its own funds
without notice or comment period,"49 as well as the failure
of the DoD to provide law schools with an explanation of
how law schools allegedly failed to comply with the Solomon
50
Amendment, violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
FAIR sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the
government from enforcing the Amendment.5 1 In support of
their motion for a preliminary injunction, FAIR asserted
that the Solomon Amendment violated the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. 52 FAIR reasoned that the DoD
45. Id. at 22-23. Under 10 U.S.C. § 983(c)(2) (2000), the Solomon
Amendment applies to all institutions of higher education except ones with "a
longstanding policy of pacifism based on historical religious affiliation."
46. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at 23.
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 25 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000)).
50. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000)).
51. To obtain a preliminary injunction, FAIR needed to establish the
following: a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, that FAIR is likely to
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the injunction would harm
the government less than denying relief would harm FAIR, and that the
injunction serves the public interest. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2002).
52. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 19-31, FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (No.
03 Civ. 4433).
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is punishing law schools for choosing not to relinquish their
expressive and associational rights,
something which the
53
government could not do directly.
In reply, the DoD alleged that the plaintiff did not
54
demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits.
According to the DoD, FAIR lacked standing to maintain
the action. 55 The DoD claimed that FAIR did not allege a
cognizable injury in fact, that they failed to establish
causation, and that they could not assert the rights of
absent law schools. 56 The DoD further countered that the
Solomon Amendment does not infringe upon First
Amendment rights because it does not transgress the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by discriminating on
the basis of viewpoint or by regulating speech. 57 They also
argued
that the
Solomon
Amendment
was
not
unconstitutionally vague. 58 Finally, the DoD examined the
irreparable injury that would occur to military recruiting if
the preliminary injunction was granted, pointing to the
presumptive constitutionality of any act of Congress. 59 The
DoD also cited public interest and the necessity and
importance of military recruiting,
especially in light of the
"global war on terrorism. ''60 Furthermore, the DoD said that
even if public interest weighs in favor of FAIR, the district
court cannot "consider any and all factors that might relate
to the public interest or conveniences of the parties ....[A]
court sitting in equity cannot 'ignore the judgment
of
1 1
Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.'

53. See id. at 31.
54. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 8-35, FAIR
I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (No. 03 Civ. 4433).
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 10-21.
57. Id. at 21-35.
58. Id. at 31-35.
59. Id. at 37 (citing Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S.
1323, 1324 (1984)).
60. Id. at 38.
61. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497
(2001) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551
(1937)).
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The district court denied the DoD's motion to dismiss
and every plaintiff was held to have standing. 62 However,
the court determined that the Solomon Amendment does
not place unconstitutional conditions on federal funding,
does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, 63 and is not
unconstitutionally vague. 64 The court thus found that FAIR
did not establish the reasonable likelihood of success65 on the
merits necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction.
B. The Third Circuit
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted
the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, thereby
enjoining enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. 66 The
court held that conditioning the receipt of a significant
amount of federal funds on compliance with the Solomon
school's
the
law
of
violation
in
Amendment
nondiscrimination policy did in fact compel law schools to
express a message with which they disagreed. 67 The
Amendment therefore impeded the law schools' right of
expressive association. 68 The Third Circuit further found
that "when the Government appropriates for a particular
spending program, it may endorse one viewpoint over
69
another by conditioning its spending on certain criteria.
The court distinguished United States v. American Library
Association70 and Rust v. Sullivan71 because in those cases
"the Government [was] not denying a benefit to anyone, but
62. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
63. This claim ends up being encompassed in other claims. It is weak on its
own because the military's policy does not regulate viewpoint; it regulates an
act under a policy that the court has already upheld as constitutional.
64. The DoD amended the Solomon Amendment so this claim became
invalid.
65. FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
66. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977

(2005).
67. Id. at 236.
68. Id. at 230.
69. Id. at 229 n.9.
70. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
71. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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[was] instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for
the purposes for which they were authorized. ' 72 FAIR's
is
Solomon
Amendment
that
the
allegation
73
unconstitutionally vague was again unsuccessful.
On January 20, 2005, pursuant to Rule 41(d)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Third Circuit
issued a stay to their decision granting the preliminary
74
injunction pending the decision of the Supreme Court.
C. The Present
On May 2, 2005, the Supreme Court accepted the DoD's
appeal. 75 Oral arguments took place on December 6, 2005.76
The Supreme Court could either uphold or strike down the
injunction, or, if the court believes the case could go either
way, it could uphold the injunction and remand the case for
a trial on the merits. 77 The government would then have
the opportunity to present facts about the importance of oncampus recruiting and equal access to JAG recruiters and

72. FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 229 n.9 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
73. In the time between the initiation of the lawsuit and the decision by the
Third Circuit, Congress passed the 2004 Amendment to the Solomon
Amendment which made clear that military recruiters must be treated equally
with other recruiters. See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2004), amended by Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No.
108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004). An informal policy is no longer
required. However, it is still unclear how the Amendment will be applied, i.e.,
whether ameliorative methods will be tolerated or whether the school will be
held accountable if faculty or students protest the military and not other
recruiters.
74. See Order Staying the Mandate Pending a Decision of the Supreme
Court, FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (No. 03-4433).
75. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 125 S. Ct.
1977 (2005). Courts review preliminary injunction factors for abuse of
discretion. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 700 (2004). However, the Court of
Appeals also reviews the determinations required to issue the injunction
according to the particular determination. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough
of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 156. The standard of review for First Amendment
claims is plenary. Id.
76. SolomonResponse.Org, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/solomonlfaircase.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
77. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 700.
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show that
a less restrictive alternative would not be as
78
effective.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, the DoD alleges
that the Third Circuit erred in its constitutional analysis. 79
First, the DoD contends that the court's reliance on Dale
was misplaced.8 0 According to the DoD, Dale involved a
leader of the Boy Scouts; whereas the military is a
temporary visitor on campuses.8 ' Also the military is not
attempting to impinge upon the school's "method of
determining
its
own
internal
composition
and
organization. '8 2 Further, the DoD believes that the
compelled speech doctrine does not apply because the
government is not compelling law schools to convey any
message.8 3 Finally, the DoD alleges that even if First

78. There is some indication that on-campus military recruiting may
enhance recruiting efforts. According to a presentation at the biannual Army
Accessions Command Research Consortium, "All enlistment decisions come
down to one-on-one contact with a recruiter. Army recruiters are the single
most important element of the marketing process .... Army Brand Group, The
Army's new approach to Marketing and Advertising, at slide 4 (January 25,
2001) (on file with author). Another presentation at a later Consortium, based
on the results of a Youth Attitude Tracking survey of sixteen to twenty-four
year-olds, concluded that personal communication and visits with military
recruiters enhance a person's propensity to enlist in the army. John Eighmey,
Influences on the Propensity to Enlist, at slides 18-19 (May 21, 2003),
http://www.usarec.army.mil/dataxfer/research/consortiumBriefings/052203/
Eighmey.pps.
Major Rachel VanLandingham, chief recruiting attorney for the Air Force
JAG Corps, said that on-campus interviewing is the main method used to
recruit legal talent. Michelle Lore, Minnesota Law Schools Review Ruling on
On-Campus Military Recruiting, MINN. LAw., Dec. 20, 2004, available at 2004
WL 64924327. The Major furthered noted that most of the Minnesota law school
students serving in the Air Force JAG took part in the on-campus recruiting. Id;
see also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 86, 87 & 87 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1986) (citing statistics of on-campus recruitment in Philadelphia and
finding that "Congress considers access to college and university employment
facilities by military recruiters to be a matter of paramount importance.").
There is no evidence that a method of military recruiting besides forcing
recruiters on campuses would be less effective.
79. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (No. 04-1152).
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 12-13.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 14.
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Amendment rights were implicated, under the standard of
review described in O'Brien, the Solomon Amendment
would be valid.8 4 For support, the DoD looks to the
spending power and the fact that the Amendment is an
indirect regulation.8 5 The DoD also claims that there is a
pressing need for immediate review because "military
lawyers play a vital role in the ongoing combat missions of
the armed forces, and the military services depend
recruit the lawyers they
significantly on campus access to
'8 6
need to carry out their missions.
FAIR maintains the same arguments that succeeded in
the Third Circuit: the Solomon Amendment imposes an
unconstitutional condition by threatening withdrawal of
federal funds unless the school relinquishes its First
Amendment rights, the Solomon Amendment compels
speech and infringes on the school's right of expressive
Amendment is subject to
association, and that the Solomon 87
and cannot survive strict scrutiny.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

According to the DoD,8 8 Congress enacted the Solomon
Amendment pursuant to the Spending Clause,8 9 the Army
and Navy Clauses, 90 and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 91 But how far do these powers extend, and what
other rights are involved when the purpose of the allotted
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id. at 20-24.

86. Id. at 24-25.
87. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, 125 S.Ct. 1977 (No. 04-1152).
88. Brief for the Appellees at 2, FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 034433).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 12 & 13 (empowering Congress to "raise and
support" the nation's armed forces).
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing "all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States"). The defendants also include here the powers vested in the President as
Commander-in-Chief under Article II.
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expenditure was to facilitate research, not to enhance
military recruitment? Arguably, if one added together all
those possible constitutional powers plus the necessity of an
army in this time of war, a conservative court and
government, and a strong patriotic sentiment nationally,
these powers could extend infinitely. However, when one
weighs recruiting JAG officers in a specific location against
preserving fundamental liberties provided for by the First
Amendment, perhaps the answer is not so clear.
A. The Spending Power
Congress' power under the Army and Navy and
Necessary and Proper Clauses is perhaps even broader
than Congress' spending power. 92 Even without the
Spending Clause, Congress could create federal spending
programs to promote military recruiting on university
campuses. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
93
Spending Clause to allow Congress significant power.
Although the constitutional limitations on Congress under
its spending power "are less exacting than those on its
authority to regulate directly," 94 the power is not
unlimited. 95
Potential constitutional conflicts surface when Congress
attempts to attach strings to its expenditures. Congress
needs to maintain a careful balance between its power, the
power of the states, and individual liberties. Further
complicating the analysis in the FAIR case is that a typical
Spending Clause analysis is not at issue. FAIR complains of
an indirect effect that the Solomon Amendment has on
their expression. FAIR is not protesting allowing military
recruiters on campus if they want federal funding; they
92. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (all recognizing Congress' "broad constitutional power" to raise and
regulate armies and navies).
93. Cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 199 (2003)
(upholding statute conditioning receipt of library funds on having pornography
blocking software in place); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)
(upholding statute conditioning receipt of a percentage of federal highway funds
on raising the drinking age).
94. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209.
95. Id. at 207.
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object to letting the military on campus and being forced to
offer them equal CSO resources because a congressional
policy regarding the military conflicts with a policy of the
school.
It is questionable how to analyze this situation
differently from a typical Spending Clause case, if it should
be looked at differently at all. Courts seem to approach
indirect control over spending as a direct regulation, by
balancing the interests of both the government and the
party regulated to determine the validity of the spending
power. 96 Although this is somewhat more removed than the
indirect control of past spending power cases, a similar
analysis seems logical given that the Court needs to
determine the most significant constitutional interests.
Pursuant to this analysis, a valid exercise requires the
following: the spending must be in pursuit of the general
welfare, the condition must be unambiguous, the condition
must be related to the federal interest, and other
constitutional
conditions must not provide an independent
bar. 97
Clearly, recruiting the most qualified students for the
military is in pursuit of the general welfare. 98 Furthermore,
the Solomon Amendment unambiguously conditions the
receipt of a university's federal funds on allowing the
military to recruit on campus. 99 However, it is questionable
whether the Solomon Amendment is related to the federal
interest it regulates. 100 Congress would have a much

96. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 203.
97. Id. at 207-08 (citations omitted).
98. Although teaching tolerance and equality in the legal profession is also
in pursuit of the general welfare and arguably attorneys are not as important to
the military as other potential soldiers.
99. See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2004), amended by Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118
Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004) ("No funds ... may be provided... to an institution of
higher education ... if the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution
...prohibits, or in effect prevents ... access to campuses, or access to students.
on-campuses, for purposes of military recruiting....").
100. The Court has thus far passed in defining the outer bounds of the
relatedness limitation. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 n.3. See also The Curious

Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech Doctrines,
117 HARv. L. REV. 2411 (2004) for a thorough attempt in defining when the
government can condition government programs on speech.
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stronger argument if there were a relationship between the
threatened Solomon Amendment funds and enhancing
military recruitment. The threatened funds are from the
Departments of Defense, Transportation, Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education, and the purposes of the
allocations vary from funding research to funding
education. 101 In addition, Congress has said that recruiting
on college campuses is important to the military; but no
documented correlation exists between the number of
recruits and the existence of recruiting on campuses. The
implemented a liberal
Court, however, seems to have
02
interpretation of relatedness.1
The fourth constitutional limitation on the spending
power, an independent bar, depends on the Court's
interpretation of the Solomon Amendment relative to the
First Amendment. In deciding the Solomon Amendment's
constitutionality, a court must determine whether the
Amendment is a legitimate exercise of Congress' spending
power, or whether, as FAIR alleges, the Amendment
imposes an unconstitutional condition on a spending
allocation. On one hand, as the DoD argues, the funding is
optional. Technically, the schools are not required to allow
the military to recruit on their campuses. The federal
funding is not a regulation; it is more like a subsidy,
obligating schools to do something that the government
finds beneficial because the government did something that
the school found beneficial. If an entity does not agree with
or desire to facilitate a federal goal, they need not accept
the funding 103
On the other hand, funding can be so substantial that it
is coercive. Presently, funding by the federal government to

101. See Amy Kapczynski, Policy Comment, Queer Brinksmanship:
Citizenship and the Solomon Wars, 112 YALE L.J. 673, 674 n.5 (2002) ("The
condition in question-access for military recruiters-bears no rational
relationship to the expenditures in question (as interpreted by the DoD), which
include funding for cancer and AIDS research."). In fact, the DoD initially did
not even support the Solomon Amendment because they feared it would harm
defense research initiatives. 140 CONG. REC. H3860, H3863 (daily ed. May 23,
1994) (statement of Rep. Underwood).
102. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 n.3 (passing on the chance to define the outer
bounds of the relatedness limitation).
103. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U. S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44
(1947); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
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state and local governments is highly necessary; most
entities have become dependent on the federal government.
Federal funding is the source of most of the money used for
education and other public necessities. For example, in
1995, the federal government provided $1.4 trillion in
domestic grants, benefits, subsidies, salaries, and goods and
services.104 Without this money education would be less
adequate than its current state. In addition, thousands of
jobs could be lost with the disappearance of various
research initiatives. Law schools are dependent on federal
funding to provide not only valuable research for the
government but to provide an adequate education to
students. 105 Without the funding, the quality of education
at most schools would undoubtedly decline, and the benefits
the government
receives from their research would likely
106
disappear.
With the quality of education promised to students at
stake, it seems that universities have no choice but to
accept the funding from the federal government, regardless
of its conditions, thus stifling their freedom of association,
expression, and speech. The government needs to consider
the valuable research its decision to withdraw funding
could sacrifice.
B. UnconstitutionalConditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions10 7 states
that even though a person does not have the right to a
government benefit, the government ordinarily cannot
condition a benefit on the surrendering of a constitutional
right. 08 Put another way, the government cannot produce a

104. Federal Aid Surpasses $5,000 Per Person in Fiscal Year 1995, U. S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS (U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.), June 18,

1996, available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/cb96-92.html.
105. See infra n.24 and accompanying text.
106. Originally this was the fear of the DoD; thus, they did not support the
Solomon Amendment. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 n.2 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd,
390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
107. For an in-depth analysis of unconstitutional conditions, see Kathleen
M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1989).

108. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 395 (2004).
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result which it could not command directly. 10 9 However, the
FAIR case is not a typical unconstitutional conditions case.
No prior unconstitutional conditions cases discuss the
intersection of constitutional issues raised by a military
policy that infringes upon the First Amendment rights of an
institution benefiting from the rights of expressive
association and academic freedom. 110 According to Rust v.
Sullivan, in the typical conditions case, "the Government
has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather
than on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded
program.""'
In the FAIR case, the government is conditioning the
receipt of the money on the recipient violating their own
internal policies and thus their First Amendment rights.
There is no federally funded program in place; 112 however,
the result is the same. Due to the equal access requirement
added to the Solomon Amendment in 2004, law schools are
prohibited from recruiting at all if they do not want to
assist the military in recruiting but need to receive funding
from the DoD to fulfill educational obligations to students.
Schools are not allowed to have a recruiting policy that
differs from that decreed by the Solomon Amendment and if
they do, they risk losing federal funding for themselves and
for their parent institutions. Schools are effectively

109. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). In Speiser, 357 U.S. at
513, the government conditioned a veterans' property tax exemption on signing
an oath swearing nonadvocacy of the overthrow of the United States
government. The Court held that even if the provision was constitutional, its
enforcement was not because the burden of proof was placed on the taxpayer.
Id.
110. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d. at 301.
111. 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991). Contra id. at 196 (finding that the
government is not denying a benefit to anyone by "insisting that public funds be
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized").
112. Both the Third Circuit and the New Jersey District Court
acknowledged that there is no government spending "program" in place. See
Fair II, 390 F.3d 219, 229, n.9 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005); FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 300. But see United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding government spending programs
conditioned on libraries filtering Internet content); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991) (allowing Congress to forbid the use of family planning services
funding for programs that provided abortion counseling).
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prohibited from deciding with whom they want to associate
and what message they want to represent to their
students.113

When actually faced with unconstitutional condition
precedent, it seems nearly impossible to systematize the
analyses. 114 Despite the
Court's very fact-specific
unpredictability, the Court has consistently applied the
doctrine to protect freedom of speech. 115 There should be "a
presumption that conditions on federal spending may not be
used to coerce conduct that would otherwise be protected by
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties." 1 6 In Bourgeois
v. Peters," 7 for example, the court found that the city could
not condition participation in a protest on requiring
protestors to submit to magnetometer searches at
checkpoints around the protest site. The protest was
against the School of the Americas (SOA), a school run by
the U.S. Army that trains military leaders from countries
throughout the Western Hemisphere in combat and
counterinsurgency techniques."18 Participating in the
protests was voluntary; however, the court found that the
government could not condition participation on submission
to searches. 119 If they did, the government would be
113. See, e.g., Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Conn. 2005)
("DoD makes no claim, nor could it the court believes, that the condition
imposed by the Solomon Amendment is in any way related, let alone
reasonably, to the purpose for which the federal funds have been given....
Under these circumstances the Spending Clause power cannot excuse a
violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as addressed in Perry and
its progeny.").
114. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.1 (1936) (finding the federal
government may not use its spending power to pressure state governments into
yielding constitutionally protected autonomy) with South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 1987) (finding a federal statute conditioning receipt of highway funds
on adoption of minimum drinking age a valid use of Congress' spending power).
"The Court has . . . rejected every federalism-based challenge to conditions on
federal subsidies since the New Deal." Sullivan, supra note 108, at 1417.
115. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S.513 (1958).
116. Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and
Constitution,39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1152 (1987); see also id. at 1152-60.
117. 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1324.

the
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requiring citizens to give up their freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures and freedoms of speech
and assembly. 120 According to the court, "the very purpose
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to prevent the
Government from subtly pressuring citizens, whether
purposely or inadvertently, into surrendering their
rights."'12 That protestors could voice their disagreement
different means did not alleviate the
with the SOA through
122
conditions problem.
Similarly, in the FAIR case, the government should not
be able to require law schools to give their resources to
military recruiters and allow the recruiters on campus if
the law schools disagree with a military policy. Accepting
the government's money could be called voluntary, albeit
coercive; nonetheless, the government cannot condition
acceptance on facilitating military recruiting in violation of
law schools' nondiscrimination policies. The government
would then be using money to purposely pressure law
schools into giving up their right to expressive association.
Here too, that CSOs and students could voice their
disagreement with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
through disclaimers does not alleviate the conditions
problem.
In Federal Communications Commission v. League of
found
Court
of California, the
Voters
Women
unconstitutional the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.123
The Act would not allow '"noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations' to 'engage in editorializing"' if they
received grants from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting. 124 Although Congress, pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, has the power to regulate the use of
broadcast communication, the Court found that Congress
must look to the First Amendment in exercising its
regulatory power.125 Under the First Amendment,
broadcasters are entitled to exercise "journalistic freedom";

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1324-25.
122. Id. at 1325.
123. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
124. Id. at 366.
125. Id. at 377-78.
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thus, their speech is protected. 126 Furthermore, the Court
found the restriction could not be justified under the
spending power. 127 The Court applied a strict scrutiny
standard of review and determined that the restriction was
not narrowly tailored because the government interest
could be "satisfied by less restrictive means." 128 In addition,
the Court noted that the government interest was "not
substantially advanced" by the statute because radio
stations had other means by which to protect themselves
from any possible coercion attempted through
the grants by
1 29
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
Likewise, the Court should find the Solomon
Amendment unconstitutional because although Congress
has the power to raise and support armies, the Court needs
to look to the First Amendment when Congress exercises its
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Under the
First Amendment, law schools, as expressive associations
with academic freedom, are also protected in their form of
expression. The exercise of the spending power in this case
is coercive given that schools may be forced to close down or
at least greatly decrease the quality of their education if
they refuse to comply with the Solomon Amendment. As in
League of Women Voters, according to FAIR, a strict
scrutiny analysis is required. 130 Allowing the government to
infringe upon FAIR's constitutionally protected rights by
conditioning the receipt of funding on a First Amendment
violation would be allowing the government to do indirectly
that which it could not do directly.' 3 ' Also, the Solomon
Amendment is not narrowly tailored because recruiters
have a wide array of other recruiting methods available to
them (i.e., mailings, phone calls, advertisements) that have

126. See id. at 376-80.
127. Id. at 399-401.
128. Id. at 395.
129. Id. at 388-90.
130. If a court chose to analyze the regulation as inhibiting conduct, the
Amendment would be subject to a less rigorous standard of review. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Either way, the court should balance the
federal interest with the law school's interest.
131. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (finding state could not
condition a property tax exemption for veterans on willingness to sign a loyalty
oath).
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not been shown to be any less effective. Similarly, because
the military has no statistics on whether or not on-campus
recruiting improves the quality and number of JAG
applicants, it is impossible to say that the government's
interest in raising a highly qualified military is
substantially advanced by the Solomon Amendment.
To establish an unconstitutional condition, FAIR must
first show that the Solomon Amendment conditions the
receipt of government funds on the abandonment of a
constitutionally protected right. 132 According to FAIR, the
Solomon Amendment does just this. Law schools must
comply with Solomon and allow the military to recruit on
campus-thus compromising their freedom of expressive
association and their academic freedom-or lose millions of
dollars in federal aid. 133 When a student accepts an offer
from an admissions office, the policies of the school play a
role in that decision. A student does not expect to enter a
school, accept its financial aid, and be held to consent to the
violation of that school's policies. 134 Consent is not even at
issue, though, since all law schools are effectively forced to
comply; the ultimatum is either consent or do not go to law
school. This is extremely coercive. Particularly for gay and
lesbian students, a school's diversity policies may be
important. Causing law schools to violate their
nondiscrimination policies and alienate students is not fair
to students or to the schools attempting to represent their
viewpoints.
C. First Amendment Analysis
In the instant case, the application of the expressive
association right depends on how the court interprets the
Solomon Amendment. If a court interprets the Amendment

132. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (noting the
particular importance in not inhibiting free speech).
133. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 229 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1977 (2005).
134. The Court has not held that accepting money waives a person's rights.
In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Court upheld the state's right to
discontinue Aid to Families with Dependent Children assistance to a recipient
who had refused to allow home visits by a caseworker. The Court's opinion
avoids any assertion that acceptance of financial support gave rise to a waiver
of the right to object to a warrantless entry.
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as infringing free speech, a strict scrutiny standard of
review applies, as in Federal Communications Commission
v. League of Women Voters of California, and the
Amendment will likely be found unconstitutional. 135 If a
court reads the Amendment as facilitating recruiting efforts
(conduct) with an incidental effect on speech, then the
Amendment will likely be upheld under O'Brien's
intermediate standard of review. 136
1. Expressive Association.137 The freedom of association
for expressive purposes is implicit in the First Amendment
freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. 138 The right to
associate with others in pursuit of "political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends" is
crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views

135. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
826-27 (2000) (concluding that the option preferred by Congress could not
survive strict scrutiny without a showing that a less restrictive alternative
would not be as effective as a total speech restriction).
136. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (finding that not all acts
implicating the First Amendment are speech based and that when conduct is
implicated only an intermediate standard of review is necessary).
137. This is FAIR's best argument; however, if they do succeed, FAIR will
actually be reaffirming the validity of discriminatory cases such as Dale and
Hurley. See David Keating, Boy Scouts Precedent Strategy Questioned, MEDILL
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM-ON THE DOCKET (June 2, 2005), http://docket.medill.
northwestern.edu/archives/002454.php.
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000), the Supreme
Court held a New Jersey law barring discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation unconstitutional because it forced the Scouts to deliver a point of
view contrary to their own. Courts have thus far rejected attempts to extend
Dale in challenges to various laws-i.e., a city ordinance prohibiting commercial
sex clubs, a gun control statute, a statute banning children's access to a
clothing-optional park, a state university's decision to disband a fraternity, and
a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Keating, supra note 138; see also David P. Gearey, Comment, New Protections
After Boy Scouts of America v Dale: A Private University's First Amendment
Right to Pursue Diversity, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (2004) (finding Dale grants
private educational entities the right to employ discriminatory affirmative
action policies).
138. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Baird v. State Bar
of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). At times the doctrine is referred to as a separate, independent freedom
protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex
rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 42930 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461-63 (1958).
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on groups that want to express different ideas. 139 The right
to associate also includes the right not to associate. 140 The
right arose out of attempts by certain states to stop the
activities of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP). 141 The Court repeatedly found
that although the states had the power to both directly and
indirectly abridge "indispensable liberties," they never
demonstrated that their needs
outweighed the harm caused
142
to the right of association.
For example, NAACP v. Button was a direct attempt by
the state government to prohibit the NAACP from urging
people to seek legal redress for alleged wrongs and from
assisting and representing them in litigation.14 3 Although
the FAIR case involves a condition to accepting funds (an
indirect attempt by the federal government), it is similar to
Button. In both cases the plaintiffs were seeking through
lawful means to attain equal treatment for mistreated
members of society. Both sought to attain equality of
treatment by the government, and thus society, for a
mistreated subpopulation.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court held for
Roberts, requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full

139. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (protecting
the right to expressive association is "especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from
suppression by the majority"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 37576 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, [the Founders of this nation] eschewed
silence coerced by law ....

Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing

majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed."), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
140. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Wis. ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. at 107.
141. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 ("Effective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced
by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.").
142. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964);
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Patterson,357 U.S. at 460.
143. See 371 U.S. at 415.
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voting members.1 44 The Court found "no basis in the record
for concluding that admission of women as full voting
members will impede the organization's ability to engage in
these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred
views. ' 145 Similarly, in the FAIR case, the military has put
forth no basis for concluding that military recruiting will be
adversely affected if not allowed equal access on campuses.
The Solomon Amendment impedes a law school's ability as
an expressive organization not to engage in activities that
go against its internal policies. This is a trespass on the
organization's message.
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,146 a recent Supreme
Court decision relied upon heavily by the Third Circuit, the
Court seemed to broaden exponentially an association's
right to define itself. In Dale, the Court held that a state
public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation could not require the Boy
Scouts to allow an openly gay scoutmaster to remain in its
association because the right of expressive association
allows groups to limit their membership. 147 In analyzing an
expressive association claim, the Dale Court looked at 1)
whether the group engages in expressive activity; 148 2)
144. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
145. Id. at 627.
146. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
147. Id.; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (finding
a violation of expressive association where government employer and union had
agreement requiring employees to pay a service fee). Although Dale applies to
public organizations, an expressive association analysis has also been applied to
private and nonprofit organizations. Compare Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying Dale criteria
and finding a fraternity was not an expressive association because it "[n]ever
took a public stance on any issue of public political, social, or cultural
importance") and New York State Club Ass'n., Inc. v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (applying expressive association analysis to a private dining
club with over 400 members) with Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27 (finding that a
large part of the Jaycees' activities were protected activity and that they "have
taken public positions on a number of diverse issues"). Both Congress and FAIR
seem to treat public and private institutions equally for purposes of the
Solomon Amendment.

148. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27. Compare Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity,
229 F.3d at 445 (finding a university could
directly restrict a group's non-expressive
would have an indirect effect on expressive
to abide by reasonable campus regulations)

"out of non-ideological motives ...
activity, even when those actions
activity" because the group refused
with Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
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whether the state action "significantly affect[s]" the
association's ability to advocate its viewpoints; 149 and 3)
whether the state's interest outweighs the burden it
imposes on the associational expression.150
According to Dale, the organization must merely engage
in some form of expression, public or private, to be an
expressive association. 151 In finding that the Boy Scouts
engage in expressive activity, the Court noted that the
organization's adult leaders inculcate its youth members
152
with a value system "both expressly and by example."'
The Court also looked at the "Scout Oath" and "Scout Law,"
the expressions for which the group allegedly
which state
53
stands.1
It is undeniable that a law school also engages in
thus an expressive
activities
and is
expressive
Oath,
the
Boy
Scout's
the
association. 154 Like
nondiscrimination policy contains a message that law
schools want to convey to its students: it is wrong to
discriminate against people based on their sexual
orientation. 155 Thus, the Solomon Amendment actually
(1972) (finding unsupported fear of disruption was insufficient to warrant the
university's denial of recognition of a student group because of the substantial
impediments resulting from lack of recognition).
149. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
150. Id. at 657.
151. Id. at 648.
152. Id. at 649-50.
153. Id. at 649.
154. According to the Third Circuit in Circle School v. Pappert, 381 F.3d
172, 182 (3d Cir. 2004), "[bly nature, educational institutions are highly
expressive organizations, as their philosophy and values are directly inculcated
in their students." See also Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 ("The college classroom with
its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'

. . .

.") (citations

omitted); infra Part 11I.C.3.
155. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005) cites a typical nondiscrimination policy as follows:
The School of Law is committed to a policy of equal opportunity for all
students and graduates. The Career Services facilities of this school
shall not be available to those employers who discriminate on the
grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap or
disability, age, or sexual orientation.... Before using any of the Career
Service interviewing facilities of this school, an employer shall be
required to submit a signed statement certifying that its practices
conform to this policy.
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represents a greater affront on the staff of law schools than
the public accommodations law in Dale where the Boy
Scouts would have been required to accept Dale as a
member. Schools are required to be proactive in their
support of a view with which they disagree.
Further, by excluding employers that discriminate, law
schools are showing, by example, that discriminatory
employment will not be tolerated by the university. 156 The
AALS would not put the policy in place if law schools did
not want to convey the message that it is wrong for
employers to discriminate based on sexual orientation
because the AALS would lose its credibility if institutions
disagreed with its policies. Further, law schools are
preparing their students to enter a profession wherein they
must be able to take an oath to uphold justice. 157 Judging

156. In fact, FAIR believes that the Solomon Amendment compels them to
disseminate the exact opposite message by forcing them to give resources to
support an employer whose message goes directly against their policy.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 25, supra note 52.
157. The oath required to join the South Carolina bar is typical of most
states' oaths. It reads as follows:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that:
I am duly qualified, according to the Constitution of this State, to
exercise the duties of the office to which I have been appointed, and
that I will, to the best of my ability, discharge those duties and will
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of this State and of the
United States;
I will maintain the respect and courtesy due to courts of justice,
judicial officers, and those who assist them;
To my clients, I pledge faithfulness, competence, diligence, good
judgment and prompt communication;
To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and
civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral
communications;
I will not pursue or maintain any suit or proceeding which appears to
me to be unjust nor maintain any defenses except those I believe to be
honestly debatable under the law of the land, but this obligation shall
not prevent me from defending a person charged with a crime;
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me
only such means as are consistent with trust and honor and the
principles of professionalism, and will never seek to mislead an
opposing party, the judge or jury by a false statement of fact or law;
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someone by the way they appear is not consistent with the
pursuit of justice. Since a law school engages in expressive
activity, it must be determined whether forcing law schools
to treat the military the same as employers who do not
sexual
orientation
would
discriminate
based
on
significantly alter a law school's ability to advocate its
viewpoints.
There is a two-part analysis necessary in examining the
second Dale criterion; the Dale Court first explores the Boy
Scouts' view of homosexuality since they do not have a
documented stance in their Oath or Law. 158 In so doing, the
Court basically agrees with the assertion of the Boy Scouts
that "homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values
embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with the
values ' 159
represented by the terms 'morally straight' and
'clean."
The Court bases its finding that the Boy Scouts
sincerely hold the view that homosexuality is wrong on a
statement by the president of the Boy Scouts and a previous
court case in which the Boy Scouts asserted the same
position. The Court notes that it is not their place to control
a group's expression simply because the 160Court or the
majority of society disagrees with the values.
In the FAIR case, this analysis is not required because
the violation of a law school's chosen expression is
apparent. The nondiscrimination policies explicitly state
that law schools are not allowed to facilitate recruiting by
employers who discriminate based on sexual orientation.

I will respect and preserve inviolate the confidences of my clients, and
will accept no compensation in connection with a client's business
except from the client or with the client's knowledge and approval;
I will maintain the dignity of the legal system and advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;
I will assist the defenseless or oppressed by ensuring that justice is
available to all citizens and will not delay any person's cause for profit
or malice;
[So help me God.]
South Carolina Bar, Lawyer's Oath, http://www.scbar.org/member/cle/Oathtext.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
158. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
159. Id. at 650.
160. Id. at 651.
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Not only do the policy and the current lawsuit support this
filed by other law school
point of view, but so do lawsuits 161
faculty and student organizations.
The second part of the second Dale criterion examines
whether the presence of a homosexual assistant
scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts'
162
desire not to portray homosexual conduct as acceptable.
Because of Dale's strong presence as an open homosexual in
his community and his position as an assistant
scoutmaster, the Court found that his presence would
impair the Scout's message. 163 Oddly, the Boy Scouts do not
allege that Dale was attempting to instill in the Scout
members that homosexual behavior is acceptable. The
possibility that a homosexual who was a Scout leader and
was open about his sexual preference in the community
could impact Scout members was enough for the Court to
determine that the Scouts could exclude Dale from their
membership.
Also, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), the Court held that a
public accommodation law that prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation could not be applied to
force parade organizers to allow GLIB to participate in
their parade. 164 Although there was no reason to believe
that the views represented by individual groups in a parade
are those of the parade as a whole, the Court decided that
enforcing the law would require the organizers to alter the
expressive content of their parade in violation of the First
Amendment. 165 The presence of an individual or group with
views allegedly in opposition to the core beliefs of the
underlying organization in both instances resulted in the
expulsion of that person or group.
Similarly, in the FAIR case, the Solomon Amendment
requires law schools to permit the presence of a group with
161. See Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005); Student
Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004); Burbank
v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 1925532 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 26, 2004).
162. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
163. Id.
164. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). GLIB wanted to march in the parade with a
banner.
165. See id.
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views contrary to the schools' stated expression that
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is
unacceptable. The military is not holding a banner that
states its discriminatory policy that disagrees with the
desired expression of law schools. However, on par with
Hurley, the military wants equal representation in the law
schools, which often includes posting signs and schedules,
sending emails, and reserving and scheduling rooms in
which recruiters can interview. 166 All this promotion makes
it seem as if the school is supporting the military as a
recruiter with valid policies.
In addition, the Court in Dale notes that associations do
not have to associate for the purpose of disseminating a
certain message to be entitled to First Amendment
protections; they just have to engage in an expressive
167
activity that without protection would be impaired.
Furthermore, as the Court explained, "the First
method of
[an association's]
Amendment protects
expression."' 168 If the Boy Scouts want to avoid questions of
sexuality and teach by example, they may elect to do so.169
Finally, the Court states that every member of a group does
in order for the group's
not have to agree on every issue 170
policy to be expressive association.
The considerable deference given the Boy Scouts in
Dale should extend to law schools. FAIR believes the
Solomon Amendment interferes with law schools' abilities
to shape the way in which they educate. 171 As an expressive
association and according to Dale, schools have the right to
decide what messages they want to represent to their
students and to the public. Like Dale, where the Court
determined that Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts forced

166. A foreseeable problem exists if the JAG interviews an openly gay
applicant. The recruiter would discourage that applicant from applying and
likely mark his or her application for future reference, thus displaying and
perpetuating the employment discrimination that the law school's policy is

against.
167. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.

171. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 52, at 20-24.
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the organization to express the message that homosexuality
is an acceptable form of behavior, 172 the Solomon
Amendment significantly affects a law schools' ability to
express the viewpoint that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is morally wrong. 173 The presence of military
recruiters at law schools and the mandatory equal
treatment by CSOs projects the view that law schools
believe it is acceptable for employers to discriminate based
on sexual orientation. The CSO is the on-campus resource
for employment. If they support and facilitate a recruiter,
then in the eyes of the students, the CSO must support the
recruiter's validity as an employer in compliance with law
school policies. Thus, pursuant to Dale, the Third Circuit
properly defers to the law schools' discretion in excluding
military recruiters. 17 4 Given the infamous nature of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and the widespread student
and faculty reaction against the policy, it is difficult to
allege that the military's presence and the facilitation of
their recruiting by CSOs would not damage the schools'
desired message.
The fact that the military is only a temporary visitor is
irrelevant-the nondiscrimination policy was created with
knowledge of the recruiting process. All other employers
who are also temporary visitors must conform to the
nondiscrimination policy. 175 The effect on the message of
the law school is permanent. 176 Schools are forced to
associate with and support a group which perpetuates a
policy that directly conflicts with their policy. Students, not
anticipating this hypocrisy may feel betrayed or

172. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
173. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977

(2005).
174. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 ("As we give deference to an association's
assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to
an association's view of what would impair its expression.").
175. See Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he
temporal duration of a burden on First Amendment rights is not determinative
of whether there is a constitutional violation.").
176. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 284 ("[P]reparation for upcoming recruiting
seasons occurs year round." (citation omitted)).
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disenfranchised. 177 Such activity is not conducive to a
diverse learning environment committed to equal
opportunity.
Although, arguably, a student could feel that her
country is betrayed by banning the defenders of our nation
from campuses, 178 as the court states in Dale, not all
members of an expressive association must agree with the
association's values. Students know or can easily determine
a school's policies before accepting an invitation to attend.
Further, patriotism and allegiance to one's country have not
prevented previous First Amendment challenges from
succeeding. 179 For example, the Third Circuit found that
requiring students to say the Pledge of Allegiance violated
the First Amendment freedom of expressive association
even though the recitations were short and schools could
make a disclaimer. 8 0° Similarly, law schools should not be
forced to disclaim their support of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy even if the military's presence is just temporary.
According to the third criterion delineated in Dale, the
court must balance the First Amendment interests implied
by the Solomon Amendment with competing societal

177. A letter written by a student to the dean of New York University after
financial burdens forced the university to cave to military recruiters confirms
this statement. The student writes:
The message I have received . . . is that although sexual orientation

has been listed in
gays and lesbians
community. They
deserving of the
groups. The .

.

our non-discrimination policy for over two decades,
are not regarded as full and equal members of our
represent a segment of the law school which is not
same level of protection in recruitment as other

. law school .

.

. is now an active instrument of their

mistreatment and exclusion ....
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 52, at 16 (citing Declaration of Robert Sweeney).
178. A former military recruiter and law student at the University at
Buffalo could not understand why law faculty and staff in particular objected to
the military policies. Stephen Watson, UB, SUNY to Review Court Ruling that
Campuses May Ban Military Recruiters, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 15, 2004, at B8.
179. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(granting an injunction against a State Board of Education to restrain
enforcement of a regulation requiring children in public schools to salute the
American flag because it violates free speech). The Court held that patriotism
should be voluntary and stated that "[t]he test to [freedom's] substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." Id. at 642.
180. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2004).
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interests. 18 ' According to the Court, the requirement that
the Boy Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would significantly burden the Scouts' rights. 182 Dale was a
leader in the group, and he was well-known as a
homosexual in his community. The Court further found that
the public accommodations law "directly and immediately
affects associational rights ... that enjoy First Amendment
protection."'1 3 The Boy Scouts stated that they did not want
to support the view that homosexuality is an acceptable
form of behavior so they should not be forced to do so. Thus,
the state's interest in preventing prejudice based on sexual
orientation did not outweigh the intrusion into8 4 the Boy
Scouts' right to freedom of expressive association.1
Similarly, the rights of the federal government must be
balanced against the associational rights of law schools.
According to the Third Circuit in the FAIR case, "[r]arely
has government action been deemed so integral to the
advancement of a compelling purpose as to justify the
suppression or compulsion of speech."' 8 5 Moreover, although
the court acknowledged the compelling interest in
recruiting talented military lawyers, it found that the
Solomon Amendment is not sufficiently tailored. 186
Pursuant to the Dale criteria, the Third Circuit did not
even have to go that far. It is enough, as above noted, that
the presence and equal treatment of military recruiters on
law school campuses would significantly burden the schools'
associational rights and that the military rights to recruit
with equal access do not outweigh the intrusion.
181. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-59 (2000).
182. Id. at 659.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005); see also Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (The
Government "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition
of such a restraint" on the First Amendment.); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.").
186. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 219. The military could use mailings,
television ads, on-line ads, recruiting at facilities that do not have these policies
in place. The author, in fact, initially became interested in the JAG Corps from
a mailing and although interviewed on campus would have gone elsewhere for
the interview.
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The DoD asserts that the government's interests "would
18 7
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,"'
finding implausible the proposition that the military would
not suffer if recruiters were not allowed onto law school
campuses.18 8 The DoD further points out the great degree of
deference afforded to Congress by the Supreme Court on
decisions regarding national defense and military affairs.18 9
Additionally, the courts have a long history of allowing the
government, out of a perceived necessity, to abridge rights
during times of war.190 However, the military never
produced any proof that recruiting on law school campuses
does increase the number of high quality applicants.' 9'
Further, as "the First Amendment does not permit the
State to sacrifice speech for efficiency,"'192 also the federal
government should not sacrifice speech for alleged
efficiency. The DoD does not say it cannot effectively
achieve its goal. It simply declares government interests
will be achieved less effectively. It seems apparent that the
military could easily use other, equally effective resources
to recruit students without the assistance of the law

187. Brief for the Petitioners at 26, FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (No. 03-4433)
(quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
188. Id. at 27.
189. Id.; see Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973);
see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("When a nation is at
war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured.... [I]f an actual obstruction of
the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect
might be enforced.").
190. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (classifying and
detaining U.S. citizen as enemy combatant without due process); Korematsu v.
United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (interning Japanese-Americans).
191. Convincing evidence would be the percentage of valuable officers
gained from law school recruiting or better, statistics regarding the possible
detrimental effects of the law school's policy on the overall numbers of recruits.
Both of these would be difficult to measure without taking into account those
who would be recruited regardless of the existence of on-campus recruiting or
an increase or decrease in the number of recruits because of the current
military activity.
192. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
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schools' CSOs. 193 The lack of any evidence proffered by the
military intimates that the government's interest does not
outweigh law schools' right to freedom of expressive
association.
The DoD further contended that military recruiting is
not intended to instill values or convey any message 194 but
rather that the recruiters are simply trying to enlist
qualified students. 195 During its time on campus, the
military does not proclaim discriminatory messages. The
JAG Corps does not deliberately make students aware that
those who display homosexual conduct cannot serve in the
military. 196 Accordingly, the district court concluded that
recruiting does not even implicate speech; it implicates
1 97
conduct that only incidentally affects protected speech.
This analysis, however, is not faithful to Dale; it seems
to transpose the issue. In Dale, the Court considered the
message that the member organization was trying to
preserve and gave deference to the group's definition of that
message. 9 8 It follows that the court in the FAIR case
should look at the message the law school is trying to
portray and give deference to the law school's reasonably
supported view of what interferes with that message. 99
Dale indicates that the intended impact of the military's

193. See id. (finding that although television and radio advertisements and
other methods that could be used by recruiters may be more costly, there is no
reason to suspect that they would be less effective).
194. However, conveying the message that the military is a good career
choice is surely a goal, as well as trying to instill the value that the military is
an honorable profession.
195. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 89, at 40.
196. Still, the discriminatory message will likely be displayed in the event of
a meeting between a JAG recruiter and an openly gay applicant. See FAIR II,
390 F.3d 219, 239 n.20 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005)
("former ROTC student who had 'wanted to be an officer in the JAG Corps since
high school' interviewed with military recruiter, admitted his homosexuality,
and was told that he was 'ineligible due to his sexual orientation') (citing
JA107).
197. This would subject the Amendment to an expressive conduct analysis
under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See infra Part III.C.2 for
further discussion.
198. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
199. As the Third Circuit did in FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 233 (2004), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
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message should not be the focus of the examination. 200 The
scoutmaster in Dale did not intend an adverse impact on
the morality of the Boy Scouts and surely Dale did not
201
believe that his presence would have such an effect.
Regardless, the Supreme Court opined that Dale's presence
would have a negative impact20 2on the Boy Scout's message,
and therefore he was banned.
If a law school is an expressive association, it has the
First Amendment right to limit who may have access to its
school. In cases where the government has directly
attempted to regulate expressive associations, a compelling
government interest will override the right to expressive
association. 20 3 This is consistent with the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. By balancing both the government's
and the law school's interests, the Court should determine
that the indirect infringement on a law schools' freedom of
expressive association outweighs the government's interest
in having military recruiting on campuses. So to determine
the degree of interference of the government, it is necessary
to determine how coercive the spending allocation is. The
Court also should look at how much a law school's message
is affected by the coercion and its implications on the school
and the students.
2. Expressive Conduct and O'Brien. In United States v.
O'Brien, the defendant argued that the 1965 Amendment to
the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which
made illegal the burning of a selective service registration

200. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. at 640.
201. Id.; cf. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 124 (1981) (finding that whether or not the internal regulations follow the
public norm, the organization, not the court, defines its policies).
202. But cf. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (both requiring
associations to accept women as members). These holdings could be construed
as reinforcing the state's important interest in not discriminating, which could
actually reinforce FAIR's argument of not discriminating based on sexual
orientation. However, discrimination based on sex is subject to an intermediate
standard of review, see, for example, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996), whereas discrimination based on sexual orientation is subject to a
rational basis review, see, for example, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579
(2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
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certificate, violated the First Amendment. 204 He believed
the burning
was symbolic speech and therefore
constitutionally protected. 205 But not every symbolic or
expressive act can be categorized as primarily speech. 20 6 In
O'Brien, for instance, the Supreme Court held that the Act
regulated conduct and the effect on O'Brien's symbolic
speech was only incidental. 20 7 Thus, the Supreme Court
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and upheld the
Act. 208
It is tempting to similarly analyze the Solomon
Amendment; however, although recruiting is conduct, the
constitutional violation alleged by FAIR is a restriction of
speech. All restriction on conduct could be said to restrict
speech. But to view the Solomon Amendment as primarily
conduct related, the court has to interpret the relevant
activity as permitting military recruiters temporary access
20 9
to campus (or as excluding the recruiters from campus).
Law schools are not being forced to passively stand by and
allow the military to recruit on their campuses; they are
being required to actively support the military through
CSOs which violates their right to represent their
nondiscriminatory message. 210 Law schools are required
through the government's spending power to represent a
contradictory message. This is not conduct; it is suppression
of the message law schools want to convey.

204. 391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968).
205. Id. at 376.
206. See City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("It is possible to
find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes...
but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protections of
the First Amendment.").
207. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms.").
208. Id.
209. To implicate the First Amendment the conduct must be "sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409-10 (1974).
210. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (the state asserted no
interest in support of Johnson's conviction unrelated to the suppression of
expression thus strict scrutiny was applied to the expressive conduct).
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when
articulated
O'Brien Court further
The
government regulation of conduct is justified: "if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on the
than is
alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater
211
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
In applying these four factors, the O'Brien Court first
found that "[t]he constitutional power of Congress to raise
and support armies and to make all laws necessary and
The power of
proper to that end is broad and sweeping ....
Congress to classify and conscript manpower for military
service is 'beyond question.' ' 212 The FAIR case is
distinguishable from O'Brien because not allowing the
military to recruit on law school campuses is not illegal, as
was burning draft cards in O'Brien, it is a violation of a
restriction placed on a government expenditure. Congress
has the power to raise a military. However, Congress does
not have the right to condition achieving its goals on
violating the First Amendment rights of individuals and
groups.
Second, the Court in O'Brien held that the government
had a compelling interest in issuing the selective service
certificates. 21 3 The military also has a compelling interest in
recruiting highly qualified attorneys for the military in the
FAIR case. However, the correlation between filling out
selective service certificates and drafting an army is
obvious. The correlation between equal access recruiting on
law school campuses and the quality or quantity of
applicants is not obvious, and the military has presented no
information justifying the alleged correlation. In addition,
lawyers are not indispensable personnel, unlike soldiers in
combat and doctors.
Third, the Act is not directly connected with speech and
does not punish O'Brien for disagreeing with the military;
the act is connected to the conduct of destroying the
certificates, regardless of the purpose behind the

211. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
212. Id. (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755 (1948)).
213. See id. at 377-81.
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destruction. 214 It is an unreasonable stretch to say that by
not burning the certificate, O'Brien felt he was being
compelled to represent a pro-military stance. Unlike Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 215 United States v.
Albertini,216 and O'Brien, the purpose behind the Solomon
Amendment is not neutral. 217 Law schools are being
punished for disagreeing with the military and following
the policies of their expressive association in contravention
of the Solomon Amendment. A law school has no other way
to express its disagreement with the military-they must
either give the military equal access to their CSOs and thus
their students or lose significant amounts of federal funding
on which universities have become dependant.
The DoD says that law schools may advertise their
disagreement with the policy, but schools still have to let
the recruiters on campus. Forcing the law school to
facilitate the military's recruiting with their own resources
implies that the school supports the military as an
employer and thus supports its policy. 218 This conclusion is
particularly apt because law schools have gone to the
trouble to create employment policies in the first place and

214. Id. at 381.
215. 468 U.S. 288 (1985) (finding a no camping law infringed upon
expressive conduct of protesters who wanted to sleep in the parks but the
regulation was neutral; there were open alternative methods of communicating
the message, and the regulation narrowly focused on the government interest in
maintaining parks, a message unrelated to suppression of expression).
216. 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (finding statute excluding those barred from
reentering military bases was a neutral regulation that served important
government interest of security, thus not violative of the First Amendment).
217. "Simply justice demands that we not give taxpayer dollars to
institutions which are interfering with the Federal Government's
constitutionally mandated function of raising a military." 141 CONG. REC. E1301 (Jan. 4, 1995) (daily ed. statement of Rep. Solomon). "[T]ello recipients of
Federal money at colleges and university that if you do not like the Armed
Forces, if you do not like its policies, that is fine. That is your first amendment
right[]. But do not expect Federal dollars to support your interference with our
military recruiters." 140 CONG. REC. H3860, H3861 (daily ed. May 23, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Solomon). "[S]end a message over the wall of the ivory tower
Id. at
of higher education . . . starry-eyed idealism comes with a price.
H3863 (statement of Rep. Pombo).
218. See Brief for Appellants at 18-19, FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-4433).
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require all employers who
visit the university to sign them
219
before being admitted.
Finally, the O'Brien Court could think of no other
means of ensuring the continued availability of the selective
service registration certificates. 220 In the FAIR case, there
exist several other methods to effectively recruit lawyers.
Students often contact JAG recruiters based on information
learned from other students, after receiving information in
the mail, or through personal career research on the
Internet. All branches of the JAG Corps have websites and
phone numbers of contacts who are very willing to set up
interviews with students. The military also has television
and radio advertisements. It seems very unlikely that
effective military recruiting would cease to exist if they
were not allowed to recruit on law school campuses.
Even if the Court were to choose to follow the logic of
the DoD and apply an O'Brien analysis, FAIR still has a
chance of success under the intermediate standard of
review. 221 Law schools bear a great burden in violating
their internal polices or in refusing a significant amount of
federal funding, 222 and thus far the DoD has not shown that
the Solomon Amendment is sufficiently tailored to the
important government interest of raising and supporting a
military. 223 Allowing recruiters on a campus that has a
specific policy against discrimination based on sexual
219. Military Recruiting at Law School Career Services Offices: Update on
Actions Regarding Executive Committee Regulation 6.19, the Obligation to
Provide Equal Opportunity to Obtain Employment Without Discrimination,
Memorandum 97-46 from Carl Monk, Executive Vice President and Executive
Director of the AALS, to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools (Aug. 13,
1997), http://www.aals.org/97-46.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
220. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
221. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 244-46; see also United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 263-64 (1981) ("[T]he phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a
talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can
be brought within its ambit. '(E)ven the war power does not remove
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties."') (quoting Home
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
222. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 218, at 13. ("[Slome members of
the community have concluded that the school is not committed to nondiscrimination, and that the law school has lost credibility to preach values of
equality, justice, and human dignity.") (citation omitted).
223. The speech restriction still must satisfy the fourth O'Brien justification,
being no greater than essential.
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orientation weakens the policy in the eyes of other
employers, effects the way students view their university,
and possibly the way students view themselves. Although
the law school is not forced verbally to proclaim the
message of the military as its own, schools must aid
military recruiting and thus appear to support the military
as an acceptable employer. 224 Evidence indicates that many
other effective methods of recruiting exist and that
recruiting was successful before the military required their
presence on law school campuses. 225 In fact, the Third
Circuit postulated that the Amendment may actually
weaken recruiting efforts because of the controversy
surrounding the perception that the military
is forcing itself
226
where it otherwise would not be welcome.
3. Academic Freedom. Academic freedom gives law
schools added force in their compelled speech and
associational
expression
arguments
because of a
university's traditional role as a battleground for new ideas
and a forum for free expression. 227 Historically, universities
have had the right to define how they educate. 228 According
to the Court, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of

224. Perhaps one could believe that supporting the military's function has
nothing to do with supporting their point of view, but that is not what the
university believes. Under Dale, expressive associations have considerable
leeway in defining their own content and the viewpoints they want to represent
to the public. Though Dale explicitly rejects an O'Brien analysis, see Dale, 530
U.S. at 659, and arguably does not apply under an O'Brien analysis, it still lays
out the standard for an expressive association even if not partaking in speech
protected under a strict scrutiny analysis.
225. Lt. Cmndr. Steve Deudermann, when Assistant Director of Education
Policy in the Pentagon's Office of Accession Policy, confirmed that "widespread
exclusion of JAG representatives from law schools has had no adverse effect on
recruiting, where other means remain available." Laurie J. Falik, Exclusion of
Military Recruiters From Public School Campuses: The Case Against Federal
Preemption, 39 UCLA L. REV. 941, 974 (1992). Former Pentagon spokesman Lt.
Col. Doug Hart also said that "[t]here are other tools for recruiting other than
having someone there on campus." Id.
226. FAIR I
679-80.

390 F.3d at 235; see also Kapczynski, supra note 102, at 676,

227. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (noting the "vital
role" universities play in democracy).
228. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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American schools." 229 Though not specifically enumerated
in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized
that First Amendment protections extend to the right of
academic freedom. 230 The right to academic freedom is thus
not only derived from the constitution but also from the
school's own commitment to freedom, allowing students and
professors to form their own path within the confines of the
university's defined mission.
There is a long history of government trying to restrict
academic institutions by limiting federal funding. 231 In
FAIR I, the district court noted that the burden on the
universities is merely incidental because the Solomon
Amendment does not infringe on the law school's choice of
who will teach, what will be taught, or who will be
taught. 232 However, this is not true. By allowing the
military on campus, the law school is required to allow the
military to teach its students. By requiring CSOs to aid in
the military's recruiting efforts (or lose funding), the
Amendment forces schools not only to violate their own
policies, a lesson not lost on law students, but also forces

229. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); see also Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) ("[I]n view of the nature of the teacher's
relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought,
and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of...
[freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association] vividly
into operation.") (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
230. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (noting that the
Court must give a "degree of deference to a university's academic decisions" and

holding that student body diversity is a compelling state interest); Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 & n.12 (1985) (noting the
importance of "autonomous decisionmaking by the academy" and limiting
judicial review of academic grounds for university's dismissal of student);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) ("Academic
freedom ... has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.");
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (invalidating state law
prohibiting employment in public schools of teachers who make "treasonable or
seditious" statements); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490 (invalidating state law
compelling college professors, as a condition of employment, to disclose every
organization to which they belong or support); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (finding
questions by the Attorney General regarding the content of a professor's
lectures an invasion of professor's academic freedom).
231. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 1149-60.
232. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 302 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
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them to teach their students that it is acceptable as an
employer to discriminate based on sexual orientation.
The alienation of a subsection of students in this
manner could discourage gay and lesbian students from
attending an institution in which they are forced to endure
such behavior. 233 In addition, the historical freedom that
universities possess to regulate their institutions is not
limited in application to the teachers and students.
Universities as a whole have the right to autonomy, and
university administrators have the right to define and
protect universities' interests. 234 Thus, conditioning the
acceptance of a significant amount of federal funds on
controlling what a law school desires to project as their
message cannot stand.
4. Compelled Speech. "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech. ' 235 As seen in Hurley, one
who chooses to speak may decide what to say and what not
to say. 236 And as explained in Dole, the federal government
may not condition a coercive amount of funds on the
237
relinquishment of a constitutionally protected right.
Because of the coercive amount of money the Solomon
Amendment threatens to withdraw, Solomon goes further
than a condition-it is compulsion.

233. If an openly homosexual student wants to be recruited by JAG, he
cannot be open about his sexuality to JAG or the CSO if he wants to be chosen
for an interview.
234. See John A. Beach, The Management and Governance of Academic
Institutions, 12 J.C. & U.L. 301, 331-33 (1985) (noting "institutional autonomy
has been argued as a basis for private university exclusion of leafletters on
campus, against federal regulation of universities, programs, and policies under
Title IX, and as the basis for a privilege protecting the university from
disclosure of [employment] information").
235. U.S. Const. amend. I; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (It is basic in our system that "no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
(emphasis added)).
236. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557 (1995); see also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410
(2001) ("[T]he First Amendment may prevent the government from . . .
compelling individuals to express certain views.").
237. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also infra Part III.A.
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FAIR alleged that in its application, the Solomon
Amendment is unconstitutional in that the government is
compelling law schools to advocate the message of the
military because they must give access and resources to the
military's recruiting effort. 238 The Third Circuit in the FAIR
case penned a persuasive argument to explain why the
Solomon Amendment is in fact compelled speech. The court
separated impermissible compelled speech into three
categories: (1) "forc[ing] a private speaker to propagate a
particular message chosen by a government," 239 (2)
"forc[ing] a private speaker to accommodate or include
another private speaker's message," 240 and (3) "forc[ing] an
individual to subsidize or contribute to an organization that
engages in speech that the individual opposes." 241 Then, the
court found that the Solomon Amendment violated all
accommodate, and
three, forcing law schools "to propagate,
242
subsidize the military's recruiting."
Recruiting is predominantly expressive behavior. Law
schools have taken the time to create policies regulating
what employers can express and what schools want to
express in the recruiting process by enacting the
nondiscrimination policy. CSOs announce recruiters' visits,
make available written and verbal descriptions of the
employer and jobs, and schedule interviews with students.
Interviews are face-to-face, personal encounters during
which the interviewer communicates not only what the
employer is looking for in an employee, but also what the
employer represents. If an active homosexual disclosed his
238. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 52, at 25.
239. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 236 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 1977
(2005) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))
(state could not enforce compulsory flag salute statute) (citing W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
240. Id. (state nondiscrimination statute could not be constitutionally
applied to require parade organizers to include homosexual group of marchers
in their parade) (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581).
241. Id. (Congress could not require mushroom growers to pay assessments
to fund advertisements to promote mushroom sales) (citing United States v.
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001)); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (recognizing a First Amendment interest in not
being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities
conflict with one's "freedom of belief').
242. FAIR HI, 390 F.3d at 236.
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or her identity to a recruiter or even to CSOs, the student
would not be interviewed or considered for a military
position. In Thomas v. Collins, the Court recognized that
''employers' attempts to persuade to action with respect to
joining or not joining unions are within the First
Amendment's guaranty. ' 243 Similarly, the military is
attempting to persuade students to join their forces, so their
recruiting should also fall within the First Amendment
protections.
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment helps establish the boundaries of protected
expression. 244 For example, solicitation is expression
entitled to First Amendment protection. 245 According to
Schaumburg, advocating is one purpose for soliciting for a
charity, but the other main purposes listed by the court are
"communication of information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes," 246 all of which are also primary purposes in
recruiting. 247 Another main purpose behind both is
economic. 248 Thus, both seem to have economic and
functional objectives as their underlying motivations, and it
expression
seems to follow that both should be considered
249
Amendment.
First
the
by
encompassed
243. 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (citing Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469) (finding an employer's expressions on the problems

with labor unions and which unions want to represent its workers are protected
by the First Amendment); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Ten. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 262 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that rule inhibiting school's
recruiting of athletes implicates First Amendment analysis).
244. In holding an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of contributions by
some charitable organizations unconstitutional, Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment required any infringement on speech must be

narrowly tailored. 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
245. See id. at 620.
246. Id. at 632.
247. Communication of information is obviously the main purpose of the
recruiter, but the recruiter is also disseminating the view that the military is a
beneficial career to which to commit. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 236-37 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 1977 (2005).
248. Surely gaining donations for one's organization is also a necessary
purpose behind soliciting.
249. It seems almost contradictory for the defendants to allege first that
they need solicitation to recruit and then say that recruiting differs from
solicitation enough to make it not a protected form of expression because

2005]

FAIR v. RUMSFELD

1361

Law schools are left with no real choice. 250 They must
either not recruit at all and lose massive amounts of money,
or display the military's information in the same manner as
all other employers. CSOs must then advertise the military
in their newsletters and emails, answer questions
concerning the military and their policies, and even
verbally encourage people to apply to the military if they do
so for other employers. 251 Law schools, as part of the
message they send to their students, should be allowed to
By
and
cannot
recruit. 252
determine
who
can
accommodating the recruiting efforts of the JAG Corps, the
universities are forced to spend their own money (most of
the federal government's money likely goes to parent
universities for research) to advertise and facilitate the
recruiting efforts by an employer who has a hiring policy
that is contrary to those of law schools.
According to the DoD, there is no suppression of free
expression because the Solomon Amendment allows
universities and students to protest the military and its
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 253 However, based on
Congress' history of changing its application of the
Amendment, 254 it is questionable whether protests and
charitable solicitations are 'characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues,' the flow of such
information would likely cease without solicitation." FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d
269, 307-08 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg,444 U.S. at 631).
250. CSOs could arguably change their policy and do nothing for all
employers but that would abrogate the need for the Office in the first place.
They could also lose the hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding but
that would quite possibly have an even more detrimental impact on the
opportunities available to students and on the learning environment as a whole.
251. According to Harvard Law School, the CSO staff assist all potential
employers by "coordinating interviews with students, counseling employers on
effective recruiting, stuffing students' mailboxes with employers' information,
social receptions for students, and printing employers'
scheduling
announcements in the School's newsletter." FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 231.
252. See Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (the decision to
invite certain people to a seminar was protected by the First Amendment,
because it was "intended. . . to convey a message").
253. Brief for Appellees, supra note 89, at 24.
254. In 2002, the DoD changed the application of the Solomon Amendment
without warning and threatened to withdraw funding from schools that had not
changed their activities since the 2000 Amendment had passed.

1362

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

ameliorative measures even will be allowed. The
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment would be
slightly more credible if the schools were able to maintain
their autonomy from the military's discriminatory policy.
However, even if they wanted to, it is unlikely that the
military could prevent protests and other ameliorative
efforts.255
Further, allowing these disclaimers does not eliminate
the First Amendment violations. 256 In Wooley v. Maynard,
the Court held that a citizen could not be compelled to
display the state's motto, with which he disagreed, on his
license plate. 257 The Court did not say that he had to
display the motto but that he could write a disclaimer next
to it (as the DoD suggests law schools can disclaim their
disagreement with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy). In
fact, the Supreme Court has held that a disclaimer is not an
adequate remedy to 258compelled speech even when the
disclaimer is effective.
255. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990) (striking down
anti-flag-burning statute because it impermissibly prohibited speech that was
"disrespectful" of the flag); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781 (1988) (finding just as the government cannot compel speech, the
government cannot compel silence); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (granting injunction against prohibition of
wearing black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam);
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (allowing
picketing of retail stores to persuade customers to cease buying a product);
Stromberg v. People of California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating a statute
that prohibited displaying a red flag as an emblem of opposition to organized
government or as an invitation to anarchistic action or as aid to propaganda of
seditious nature).
256. "Otherwise the state may infringe on anyone's First Amendment
interest at will, so long as the mechanism of such infringement allows the
speaker to issue a general disclaimer." Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182
(3d Cir. 2004). This is inconsistent with the First Amendment. A further
problem with the law school disclaiming the military's policy is that it brings
the policy to light and, in effect, displays the policy as representative of the
military and the law school for allowing the military to come. Those that may
not associate the military with a discriminatory policy will do so if there are
signs noting the school's disagreement with the military's policy.
257. 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
258. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16
n.11 (1986) (finding a disclaimer is not sufficient, even if it "serves only to avoid
giving readers the mistaken impression"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765 (1972) (finding that freedom to reframe or contradict a compelled message
is not a suitable antidote).
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Furthermore, the freedom not to be compelled to speak
necessarily includes the right not to be compelled to
respond. 259 Thus, it is not enough even if the DoD allows
law schools to post signs renouncing the "Don't Ask Don't
Tell" policy and hold open discussions with students to try
to assuage any discomfort with the policy. Accordingly, even
if conduct were at issue and law schools were passively
allowing recruiters on campus, the compelled response
could be enough to find the Solomon Amendment
unconstitutional.
The difference between the passive representation in
Wooley and the even more indirect, but active,
representation in the FAIR case is "essentially one of
degree." 26 0 Blatant or not, both plaintiffs believed they were
forced to publicly represent the message of the
government. 26 1 According to Wooley, a major factor in
determining compulsion in these cases is public
representation. 262 Posting signs, handing out flyers, and
sending emails to students are public acts that observers

259. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In Pacific Gas, the Court
held that the Commission's order to place the newsletter of a third party in its
billing envelopes compelled the utility to express points of view and conform to
an agenda that it did not set, even though the state court determined that
ratepayers owned the space in the billing envelopes. 475 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 18 (1986);
see also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding
statute invalid that compelled newspapers to print replies of candidates that
newspaper criticized).
260. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
261. Similarly, in Wooley, the Court notes that the holding will not require
the destruction of the national motto "In God We Trust" from currency because
a vehicle is "readily associated with its operator" whereas currency need not be
displayed to the public. 430 U.S. at 717 n15. This distinction by the Court
somewhat parallels the military's situation. The Solomon Amendment forces
schools to represent, though not as directly, the military as a legitimate
employer. As a result, the military's employment policies are legitimated.
The military, however, is not compelling soldiers to represent anything by
not allowing homosexual conduct. First of all, the military is not suppressing
the viewpoint of homosexuality, it is suppressing the conduct. Second, the
soldiers' conduct does not need to be displayed to the public. But, as far as the
Court is concerned, compelling someone not to speak is not significantly
different than compelling speech. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457, 481 (1997). It is questionable whether or not conduct is analyzed
similarly.
262. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15.
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will likely interpret as the school supporting the military as
a legitimate employer.
In cases such as FAIR, which affect free expression,
regulations must be narrowly tailored. According to the
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button, "[b]road prophylactic
rules . . . are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone .... ,,263 Phillips v. Borough of Keyport further
notes that the legislature must do its best to ameliorate any
First Amendment harms. 264 In Wooley, the Court found that
although the license plates facilitate the compelling
government interest of identifying passenger vehicles, there
were other ways to distinguish passenger vehicles-the
265
regulation was not sufficiently narrowly tailored.
Congress' judgment regarding the necessity of a restriction
on speech must be supported by "reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence. ' 266 The DoD, thus far, has
produced no solid proof that the compelled speech greatly
increases the military's ability to raise and support
armies. 267 The government also did not show that harm
would result if military recruiters8 were not treated the
same as other employers by CSOs.26
263. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted).
264. 107 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 1997). Congressional records seem to
indicate more of a desire to teach college students a lesson then to infringe on
First Amendment rights as unobtrusively as possible. See H.R. REP. No. 108443, at 7 (letter from Undersecretary Chu) ("at a time when our nation is at
war, this situation is intolerable"); 150 CONG. REC. H1706 (daily ed., Mar. 30,
2004) (statement of Rep. Bachus) (noting that disrespectable protests are
beyond belief "in a country that is at war").
265. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1986) (holding that the Public Utilities
Commission order was not justified by the state's interest in promoting speech
to make a variety of views available to the ratepayers or state's interest in fair
and effective utility regulation because the state could serve the interest
through means not violative of the First Amendment).
266. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994).
267. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted)
("[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.").
268. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664 ("When the Government
defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent
anticipated harms . . . [i]t must demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
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IV. SUNY
Consistent with Congress' treatment of the institutions
thus far, the author chose to treat similarly public and
private universities. However, public institutions have the
potential to encounter many more barriers because they are
controlled by numerous external sources. The University at
Buffalo, State University of New York (SUNY), for example,
is in a different situation than most other New York
universities. SUNY has a long history of opposing military
of the military's
because
on campus
recruiting
discriminatory hiring practices against homosexuals, a
stance at odds with state government. 269 In 1996, Governor
Pataki passed Executive Order No. 34, which stated:
the State University of New York and all other State college
campuses shall not bar, restrict, or otherwise limit the access of
representatives of any military organization operating under the
authority of the Federal government to university and college
facilities and services for the purpose of informing students of
educational, occupational, and career opportunities offered by the
United States armed forces .... 270

Executive Order No. 34 was meant to overrule
Executive Order No. 28271 and Doe v. Rosa.272 Executive
Order No. 28 denied military representatives access to
CSOs because of federal laws and policies of the military
that discriminated based on sexual orientation. 273 Rosa is a
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these
harms in a direct and material way.").
269. See Kalil, supranote 13, at 891.

270. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.34 (1996). Interestingly, the
order also reaffirms New York's policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation for state workers.
271. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.28 (1983), amended by Exec.

Order No. 28.1 (April 21, 1987).
272. See Doe v. Rosa, 606 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1993); see also Lloyd v.
Grella, 83 N.Y.2d 537, 545 (1994) (finding the school board has the ability to
exclude military recruiters because they discriminate based on sexual
orientation even though it clashes with the state legislature's intent in
Education Law § 2-a of allowing military recruiters equal access).
273. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.28 (1983), amended by Exec.

Order No. 28.1 (April 21, 1987). When an "Executive Order directs, rather than
requests, State agencies or employees to conduct a designated program, the
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New York State Supreme Court decision that found the
application of Executive Order No. 28 consistent with
Education Law, which mandated that universities receiving
state funds permit military recruitment "on the same basis"
as other employers because all employers would be banned
if they discriminated based on sexual orientation. 274 The
court found that, regardless of the federal law, a law school
could still enforce its nondiscrimination policy. 275 Basically,
New York decided that schools could keep military
recruiters out (even though they technically had to let them
in) because of the military's formal and informal
discriminatory policies. Problematically, the decision in
Rosa may indicate that absent a judicial decision or a
legislative act to the contrary, Executive Order No. 34 will
still stand in the SUNY 276system, even if the Solomon
Amendment is overturned.
However, in Under 21 v. City of New York, the court
held that the mayor exceeded his authority by forbidding
city contractors from discriminating against homosexuals, a
classification not protected by any city legislative
enactment. 277 Thus, in New York, because the governor is
mandating specifically what the schools and, if overturned,
the Courts, have ruled against, the Executive Order could
be void as an encroachment on legislative prerogative. 278
order has the force and effect of law." Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185, 193 n.1
(1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
274. Rosa, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 522; see also Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n
at the Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Conn., 673 A.2d 484
(Conn. 1996) (interpreting a statute like the Education Law provision to require
the school give equal treatment to military recruiters as other recruiters if they
violated the nondiscrimination policy).
275. Rosa, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 526 ("Short of a challenge to the Executive Order
*

.

. ,

it is proper to treat an Executive Order as operating 'with full force of

law."') (citations omitted); see also Nomi v. Regents for Univ. of Minn., 796 F.
Supp. 412, 418 (Minn. 1992), vacated as moot at time of appeal 5 F.3d 332 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe mere fact that the military's practice of discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation is permissible under federal law does not deprive the
University of power to limit recruitment speech."). There is no federal law that
mandates allowing the military to recruit on campus; the universities just risk
losing funds.
276. See Kalil, supranote 13, at 898.
277. 65 N.Y.2d 344 (1985).
278. See Kalil, supra note 13 (executive order requiring building contractors
to undertake programs of affirmative action to insure equal employment
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Further, if the Solomon Amendment was overruled, there
would no longer be the risk that local antidiscrimination
ordinances would conflict with federal interests, so the
Executive Order would be on shakier ground. If the
Amendment
Solomon
the
finds
Court
Supreme
unconstitutional, then New York Courts should be required
to follow suit and overturn Executive Order No. 34.
CONCLUSION

Law schools should not be forced to accommodate the
JAG recruiters given the baseless discrimination behind the
military's policy and the coercive affect of the Solomon
Amendment. However, law schools also should not be
allowed to exclude recruiters if they are invited on campus
by a student or group. Otherwise, the school would be
suppressing the free association rights of students to seek
careers with desirable employers, which is counterintuitive
since without its students the university would have no free
association rights to protect. If the Solomon Amendment is
found unconstitutional, and truly impacts military
recruiting, Congress may be pushed further in the direction
of altering the military's policy of prohibiting homosexual
conduct. Regardless, given the recent decision in United
States v. Bullock, 279 reflecting the Supreme Court's decision
in Lawrence v. Texas,280 the "Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy
may be nearing extinction. The military no longer has a
legal basis to discriminate based on the criminality of
homosexual conduct and has yet to offer any evidence that
the presence of homosexuals in the military affects unit
cohesion. 281 Further, although "[i]t is the military that
opportunities exceeded authority of Governor as it impinged on legislative
branch) (citing Fullilove v. Carey, 406 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1978), aff'd, 48 N .Y.2d 826
(1979)); Matter of Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641 (1976) (regulations
requiring affirmative action in form of minority employment percentages are in
excess or executive authority).
279. No. 20030534 (Army Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (dismissing sodomy
charge against a heterosexual male because the act is not outside the liberty
interest recognized in Lawrence), petition for rev filed, No. 05-0239/AR (Jan. 14,
2005).
280. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Texas sodomy statutes as applied to
adult males who had engaged in consensual act of sodomy in privacy of home).
281. Lindsay Gayle Stevenson, Military Discrimination on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Solomon Amendment, 37
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ensures the freedoms of college faculty and students to
voice their opinions in our open and free society," 28 2 it would
be ironic if, without the most vital cause, one of the very
was sacrificed in the name of
liberties worth defending
28 3
national defense.

Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (citing studies by RAND and the GAO that
indicate homosexuality has no impact on cohesion in military units).
282. Benjamin Bartlett, Court Overturns Recruiter Access Law, THE UCSD
GUARDIAN ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2005, http://www.ucsdguardian.org/cgi-bin/news?art=
2005_01_03_04 (quoting Rep. Richard Pombo, a republican from California and
one of the Solomon Amendment's co-sponsors).
283. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 949 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519
U.S. 948 (1996) (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 264 (1967), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996)).

